ABSTRACT
Introduction
Investments into research and development are an important spending item. Table 1 reports the gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD ) as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in 21 OECD countries. These R&D spending shares dier vastly even within the OECD: some countries spend just about 1 per cent, while countries like Sweden, Finland or Korea devote much larger shares of their national income to R&D expenditures. A substantial share of these expenditures is nanced publically with taxpayers' money. This includes purely public research projects and higher education spending, as well as subsidies to private R&D, innovation funds, and so on. Typically, the public share of the total GERD exceeds one third and moves up to more than two thirds in some countries, which adds up to considerable per-capita amounts that governments spend annually for R&D purposes. As Table 1 shows, this public research expenditure has increased in almost all OECD countries during the recent time period from 2000 to 2007/08, the Netherlands and Japan being two exceptions. That is, public spending on research and development has apparently become more important over time, and now looms higher on policy agendas than it was the case about 10 years ago. Table 1 here It is well understood that R&D investments are a key ingredient of sustained economic growth, as they raise the amount of innovation in an economy (Grossman and Helpman 1991) . It is also well understood why governments are heavily involved in the nancing of basic research, since the public good characteristics of knowledge and ideas tend to jeopardize private investment incentives (Nelson 1950) . What is less well understood in the literature, however, is how international trade aects the incentives of a government to strategically invest into the country's technological potential by supporting basic research or conducting public R&D. There seems to be a widespread perception among policymakers that such public R&D investments become increasingly important in a world with falling trade barriers, since developed countries perceive the need to support domestic rms in maintaining competitiveness on global markets.
1 Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical literature which has formally studied these issues.
1 See, for example, the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2008): Providing high-quality education and investing more and more eciently in human capital and creativity throughout people's lives are crucial conditions for Europe's success in a globalized world (p.9). Also see Zhou and Leydesdor (2006) for a discussion that particularly emphasizes the role of China's rise in the world economy in that regard.
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In this paper, we develop a two-country general equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous rms à la Melitz (2003) .
2 In our framework, entrepreneurs can enter a monopolistically competitive manufacturing industry subject to a sunk cost. Upon entry, they randomly draw their productivity level from a known distribution. As in Demidova (2008) , we consider this distribution to be country-specic, but in contrast to that paper we allow for endogenous technology dierences across countries. In particular, the government of either country can invest into basic research. These research investments raise the country's technological potential, which is modelled as a right-shift of the support of the distribution from which the domestic entrants draw their productivity level. By raising the technological potential of a country, these public investments initially lead to an increase in the expected value of entry. Entrepreneurs still face uncertainty about their individual productivity, and may end up with a draw that is too low to be able to remain in the market. The public research investments therefore do not oset idiosyncratic risks of business failure, which is consistent with the evidence that even the most highly developed and advanced economies (like the US, Germany or Japan) are characterized by substantial exit and churning rates among rms (Geroski 1995) . If these investments do not benet every rm ex post, they do raise the ex ante premises for entrepreneurs, however. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of this policy thus necessarily requires a model with rm heterogeneity and ex ante uncertainty among entrants.
3
The motive for public research investments in our model is that the increase in the country's technological potential eventually leads to tighter rm selection and higher average productivity of rms, which in turn lowers prices and raises welfare in equilibrium.
In the open economy, there is an additional strategic motive. If one country invests more than the other, this yields tougher selection in the leading and softer selection in the laggard country. Exporting becomes easier for rms from the leading country, as the export market is now easier to capture. Firms from the laggard country face tougher competition in their home market, and exporting becomes more dicult. Public research investments 2 It is a well-established empirical fact that there is substantial rm heterogeneity even in narrowly dened industries in such dimensions as productivity, size, or export activity. See, e.g., the empirical studies by Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Aw et al. (2000) , or Clerides et al. (1998) . This empirical observation has triggered a large theoretical literature on trade with heterogeneous rms, e.g. Melitz (2003 ), Bernard et al. (2003 , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , Demidova (2008) . Strategic investments into a country's technological potential have not yet been considered in that literature, however.
3 In a model with homogeneous rms and without ex ante uncertainty, such as Krugman (1980) , a technological improvement would be tantamount to a decrease in marginal costs of all rms. Our model highlights dierent features, as it is crucially based on the extensive margin of rms' entry, survival, and exporting activities. 2 thus give domestic rms on average a competitive advantage, and countries tend to invest more the higher the level of trade openness is. This result is consistent with the empirical observation that almost all OECD countries have raised R&D spending during a period that was characterized by falling trade barriers. From a normative perspective, the investments induce a negative cross-country externality so that single countries overinvest. There are thus welfare gains from supranational coordination of public research investments. We also allow for direct R&D spillovers across countries, following a huge literature that has studied R&D spillovers across rms.
4 That is, the public research investment in one country may, to some extent, also raise the technological potential of the other country, because the generated knowledge becomes at least partly accessible across the border. With cross-country spillovers the socially optimal investment level is higher the freer trade is, and the over-investment problem is reduced and may even turn to an under-investment problem if the spillover is strong enough. This paper is related to the large literature on public investments into research and development, e.g., Gonzales and Pazo (2008) , Kleer (2008) . We add to this literature by analyzing the positive and normative consequences of those investments in an open economies context, and by studying how trade liberalization aects the strategic investment incentives in general equilibrium. Our paper is also related to the small but growing literature on policy issues in models of international trade with heterogeneous rms, e.g. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009 ), Chor (2009 ), or Pueger and Suedekum (2009 .
However, no paper has so far considered government investments into basic research and endogenous cross-country dierences in technological potentials. Finally, our paper is related to the literature on international tax competition. The typical setup of those models is that jurisdictions compete for mobile factors or rms, and there is an extensive discussion whether tax competition then leads to under-or over-provision of public goods (e.g., Zoodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005) . Our framework diers in two important respects. First, there is no cross-country mobility but all policy eects are transmitted via (costly) trade. Second and more importantly, though one may think of the research investments as the provision of a public good that makes rms (on average) more productive, our analysis relies crucially on rm heterogeneity and ex ante uncertainty features that have been rarely studied in the tax competition literature so far.
5
4 See, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal (1989) , Jae (1989) , Adams (1990) , Jae et al. (1998) The recent papers by Davies and Eckel (2009) and Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010) are exceptions, but they do not consider public research investments and their trade-mediated eects.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we consider a closed economy version of our model, and in section 3 we introduce the open economy setting. Section 4 derives the Nash-equilibrium and the cooperative policy for the case without direct crosscountry spillovers, while section 5 considers the case with spillovers. Section 6 concludes.
Closed Economy
We rst consider a closed economy which is populated by L workers who inelastically supply one unit of labor each. Labor is the only factor of production and perfectly mobile across two industries: a homogeneous goods sector A with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and a manufacturing industry C which is monopolistically competitive and consists of a continuum of dierentiated varieties. Each variety is produced by a single rm under increasing returns to scale, and the rms are heterogeneous in their productivities.
Preferences
The preferences of a household h are dened over the homogeneous good, which is used as the numeraire, and the set of dierentiated varieties Ω. Utility is represented by a quasilinear, logarithmic function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subutility over the set of varieties:
where 0 < ρ < 1 and β > 0. The household's consumption of a variety z is given by q h (z).
The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by σ ≡ 1/ (1 − ρ). The CES price index for the bundle of varieties can then be derived in the standard way, and reads as P = z∈Ω p (z)
. Utility maximization implies per-capita expenditures P C h = β and A h = y h − β for the manufacturing aggregate and the homogeneous good, respectively. We assume that β < y h , i.e., that the preference for varieties is not too large.
Indirect utility is then given by:
We drop the index h from now on as all households are identical. Total demand and revenue for a single variety z can then be computed as q (z) = βLp (z) −σ P σ−1 and
Production and Firm Behavior
In sector A one unit of labor is transformed into one unit of output. Since the price for that good is normalized to one, and since workers are mobile across sectors, this implies that the wage in the closed economy is also equal to one. In the manufacturing industry, a rm needs l = f + q/ϕ units of labor to produce q units of output. The overhead cost f is the same, but the marginal costs 1/ϕ are heterogeneous across rms. A higher value of ϕ represents a higher rm-level productivity. Firms have zero mass and thus take the price index P as given. Since consumers have iso-elastic demands, it is straightforward to see that rms charge prices which are constant mark-ups over rm-specic marginal costs, p (ϕ) = 1/ (ρϕ). As rms dier only in productivity, total demand and revenue for a single variety can be rewritten as q (ϕ) = βL (ρϕ) σ P σ−1 and r (ϕ) = βL (ρϕP )
respectively, and prots are given by π (ϕ) = r (ϕ) /σ − f . It is evident that a rm with a higher productivity charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity, and has higher revenue and prots. The CES price index can be rewritten as follows:
where M is the mass of manufacturing rms (consumption variety), µ (ϕ) is the productivity distribution, and ϕ is the average productivity across those rms in the market.
Entry, exit and the technological potential
We now embed this static model into a dynamic framework in continuous time. Entrepreneurs can enter the manufacturing industry subject to a sunk entry cost f e . The mass of entrants is given by M E at each point in time. Upon entry, they learn about their productivity level ϕ, which is randomly drawn from a common and known distribution. In this paper, we assume that entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution:
Here, k > 1 is the shape parameter and ϕ M IN > 0 is the lower bound. 6 Figure 1 illustrates the fat-tailed shape of the Pareto distribution, and it particularly focuses on the economic meaning of the parameter ϕ M IN . We depict two Pareto distribu-6 This modelling strategy where rms randomly draw their productivity follows Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) . It has become the seminal approach for studying rm heterogeneity in a general equilibrium model. The Pareto distribution is widely used in this literature, see Bernard et al. (2003) or Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , and also ts empirical rm size distributions fairly well, see Axtell (2001 
Figure 1 here
After learning about the idiosyncratic productivity draw, every rm decides whether to remain active in the market or to exit immediately. If a rm remains active, it earns constant per-period prots as described above. Since a rm cannot cover the per-period xed costs f when ϕ is too low, it turns out that all rms with a productivity draw below some cuto level ϕ * decide to exit, while all rms with a draw above ϕ * remain active. As in Melitz (2003) , every active rm can then be hit by a bad shock with probability δ > 0 at each point of time, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the rms' productivity draws. If this shock occurs, the rm must shut down. In a stationary equilibrium without time discounting, the mass of entrants which successfully enter the market equals the mass of rms which are forced to exit:
is the ex ante survival probability of entrants. The endogenous productivity distribution among active rms, µ (ϕ), is then the conditional ex ante distribution g (ϕ) on the domain (ϕ * , ∞], which in the present case is also a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium can be characterized by two conditions. The free entry condition (FEC) states that the value of entry, v
is driven to zero. This in turn
implies that:
The zero cuto prot condition (ZCPC) pins down the revenue of the cuto rm, r (ϕ * ) = σf , which by using r ( ϕ) /r (ϕ
with k > σ + 1. Using (FEC) and (ZCPC), we obtain the following equilibrium cuto productivity under autarky, denoted by ϕ * AU T :
where δf e must be suciently low and/or f suciently high to ensure that Γ > 1, which is required for consistency. Under the Pareto distribution, the average productivity among all active rms is then proportional to the cuto productivity, ϕ AU T =
Furthermore, since aggregate expenditure on varieties, βL, must equal aggregate revenue of manufacturing rms, R = M r = M r ( ϕ), we obtain M = βL/r, where r = σ (π + f ),
The equilibrium masses of entrants and of surviving rms can thus be expressed explicitly as:
Finally, using (1), (2), (3) and (4), indirect utility can be computed as follows:
where
ln (β/σf ) is a constant. Notice that welfare is increasing in the population size L and in the cuto productivity ϕ * AU T . Notice further that an increase in the technological potential leads to a proportional increase in the cuto and the average productivity, and hence to a welfare gain, while the masses of entrants M E AU T and of surviving rms M AU T are independent of ϕ M IN .
To understand this, consider the eect of an increase in the technological potential in the short run. For a given cuto productivity, this raises the survival probability and, hence, the rms' expected prots. More entry is induced, and more rms appear in the market in the short run. This increases competition and causes exit of the least productive incumbent rms, which in turn raises the cuto, lowers again the ex ante survival probability, the expected prots and, hence, the value of entry. Under the assumed Pareto distribution, these opposite eects turn out to be of equal magnitude, so that an increase in the technological potential eventually leaves the masses of entrants and surviving rms unaected in the long run, but increases the cuto and average productivity among the surviving rms. In other words, an increase in the technological potential does not lead to more but to better rms in the long run equilibrium. These better rms charge lower prices and sell more output, which implies a welfare gain for consumers. Aggregate spending on varieties (i.e., aggregate revenue of manufacturing rms) remains constant at βL, however. 7 2.5
Investments into basic research and the technological potential
We now consider the government which levies a lump-sum tax on households and spends the tax revenue on basic research, i.e., on public research foundations, labs, innovation funds, higher education, and so on. In our model, those public research investments lead to an increase in the country's technological potential ϕ M IN . Notice that this provision of basic research does not lead to ex post gains for all rms, which still face idiosyncratic risks of business failure. The gains of this policy arise from an ex ante perspective, by improving the premises for domestic entrepreneurs.
For simplicity we normalize the country size to one, L = 1. The tax rate is denoted by t, and since w = 1 and L = 1, total tax revenue is given by T = t. The variable T also denotes the total public research expenditure, since we assume a balanced budget and an ecient government. The total amount of basic research is denoted by H (T ), and in the case of zero expenditure we have H (0) = 0. For positive expenditure levels, we assume that there are positive but decreasing marginal returns, i.e., H = ∂H/∂T > 0, and H = ∂H /∂T < 0, and we impose a mild condition on the curvature of this schedule, (H ) 2 < −H , which facilitates our analysis below. The country's technological potential depends positively on the level of basic research, and for concreteness we assume the following specication:
which normalizes the technological potential to unity if the country conducts no basic research. It is then straightforward to show that public research expenditure raises the technological potential with decreasing marginal returns:
Finally, turning to welfare in the closed economy, we can rewrite expression (5) in the following way by using (3), L = 1, and y = 1 − T :
where κ 2 = κ 1 + β ln Γ is a constant. The government maximizes this expression with respect to T . The condition for a welfare maximum is given by 7 The exponential specication of ϕ M IN in (6) is analytically convenient, but our subsequent results do not crucially hinge on this functional form.
and from equation (8) we can disentangle the dierent eects of higher research expenditure on welfare. A higher T raises the technological potential of the country, and thereby the cuto and the average productivity of rms in the market. This in turn lowers the price index, increases physical consumption of the dierentiated varieties, and eventually leads to a welfare gain at the margin βH . On the other hand, the required lump-sum taxes have a negative unit welfare burden at the margin, since the consumption of the homogenous good is reduced. Using (8), we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 i) The government invests into basic research if βH > 1 for any 0 < T < 1, which is the case if consumers have a suciently strong preference for varieties β.
ii) The higher β is, the higher is the optimal expenditure level and tax rate T * AU T .
The proof of part i) follows directly from (8). The comparative static result ii) can be derived by the implicit function theorem. Dene ζ ≡ H − 1/β, so that we have:
To illustrate proposition 1, consider the example H = √ T which satises the aforementioned curvature condition. In that case we have H = 1/ 2 √ T , and solving H = 1/β then leads to T * AU T = β 2 /4 > 0.
Notice that the implementation of this policy aects the manufacturing sector only at the intensive margin in the long run equilibrium: rms become more productive but consumption variety M AU T does not change. In the short run there are instantaneous changes at the extensive margin, however, as we have discussed above. Notice also that this policy aects the resource allocation as it increases the share of the workforce that is employed in the manufacturing sector. 8 8 In the homogeneous goods sector, aggregate revenue needs to equal aggregate factor payments due to perfect competition. Since the tax lowers the consumers' disposable incomes, and since all income eects of demand accrue in the A-sector, this implies that (1 − β − t) L = (1 − γ) L, where γ is the manufacturing employment share. This implies γ = β + t, i.e., higher taxes increase the manufacturing share because aggregate physical output of the manufacturing sector increases which requires more labor there.
3 Open Economy
We now consider a scenario with two countries r = 1, 2. These countries are identical in population size (L 1 = L 2 = 1), but may dier in their technological potentials. Ultimately we are interested in the determination of the endogenous public research investments that imply those dierences, see sections 4 and 5 below. In this section, we rst neglect taxes
and analyze the open economy equilibrium when the countries' technological potentials are exogenously given. Specically, we assume that entrants in both countries draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter k, but country 1 has a higher technological potential than country 2, i.e., ϕ
In the A-sector there are no trade costs. This ensures factor price equalization provided both sectors are active in both countries after trade. In sector C there are two types of trade costs. First, there are per-period xed costs of exporting, f x , that arise if a rm decides to serve the market in the other country. Second, there are the standard iceberg trade costs, i.e., for one unit of output to arrive the rm needs to ship τ > 1 units.
The open economy equilibrium can be determined similarly as in the closed economy case, also see Melitz (2003) , Demidova (2008) , and Pueger and Suedekum (2009) The (ZCPC) changes due to the fact that rms can now engage in exporting. Ex ante expected prots in country r (conditional on survival) can now be written in the following way: π r = π r ( ϕ r ) + p xr π xr ( ϕ xr ), where p xr = (ϕ * r /ϕ * xr )
k is the probability to be an exporter among all active rms from country r, π xr ( ϕ xr ) is the corresponding expected export prot level, ϕ r is the average productivity among all active domestic rms, and ϕ xr is the average productivity among all exporting rms from country r.
, which holds under the Pareto distribution, the (ZCPC) can be rewritten as follows, π r =
is a measure of trade openness. Substituting the (FEC) into the (ZCPC) then leads to a system of two equations, which can be solved for the equilibrium cuto productivities in the two countries:
where Γ > 1 is as dened above, and where χ = ϕ
k < 1 measures the relative technological potential of country 2. We assume f x ≥ f , which is sucient for 0 < φ < 1. A higher φ then indicates a higher level of trade openness, with φ → 1 and φ → 0 capturing the borderline cases of free trade and autarky, respectively. We need to impose that the technological asymmetry is suciently small relative to the level of trade openness, namely χ > φ, to ensure that ϕ * r > 0 for r = 1, 2. Provided this condition holds, we also have ϕ * r > Γ · ϕ M IN r for r = 1, 2, i.e., both countries have a higher cuto productivity in the open economy than under autarky, which illustrates the selection eect of trade emphasized by Melitz (2003) . Furthermore, domestic and export cutos can be linked as follows:
implies the following ranking of productivity cutos:
there is tougher selection in the technologically leading country 1. Firms from country 1 hence have a higher cuto and average productivity than rms from country 2.
To complete the description of the equilibrium we need to determine the share of the workforce that is employed in the manufacturing sector in either country. As in Demidova (2008) and Pueger and Suedekum (2009) we use the aggregate trade balance condition for country 1 to solve for γ r for r = 1, 2. In the Appendix we show that they are given by:
It follows from (11) that γ 1 = γ 2 = β if countries are symmetrical (χ = 1), or if trade costs are prohibitive (φ → 0). In the asymmetrical case (χ < 1) we need to impose parameter restrictions such that both sectors are active in both countries after trade, 0 < γ r < 1 for r = 1, 2. These conditions are spelled out in the Appendix. Using γ 1 and γ 2 as given in (11), it is then straightforward to derive the equilibrium masses of entrants (M E r ), surviving rms (M r ), exporting rms (M xr ), and consumption variety (M tr = M r + M xs ) for both countries also see the Appendix. The CES price index in the open economy is given
, where ϕ tr is the average productivity among all (domestic and foreign) rms active in market r. Finally, welfare in country r can be written as follows:
which is suciently described by the domestic cuto productivity ϕ * r that, in turn, depends positively on the country's technological potential ϕ M IN r , as can be seen from (10).
Proposition 2 summarizes the main insights for the case where the two countries dier exogenously in their technological potentials. The proof is also relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose country 1 has a higher technological potential than the identically large country 2. Furthermore, assume that the parameter restrictions (A3) hold (see the Appendix), so that 0 < γ r < 1 for r = 1, 2. The technologically leading country 1 then has: i) more entrants (M
, ii) more surviving rms (M 1 > M 2 ), iii) more exporting rms (M x1 > M x2 ) and a higher exporting probability (p x1 > p x2 ), iv) greater consumption diversity (M t1 > M t2 ), v) higher average productivity of domestic rms ( ϕ 1 > ϕ 2 ), vi) higher productivity of rms active in the domestic market ( ϕ t1 > ϕ t2 ), and vii) higher welfare (V 1 > V 2 ).
These results illustrate the benets of having a higher technological potential in an open economy setting. Those benets play a crucial role when thinking about the government incentives for basic research investments that will be analyzed in the next section. It is also instructive to consider the role of trade in amplifying those benets. Specically, consider two autarkic economies 1 and 2 that are identical, except that country 1 has a higher technological potential. Using (3) the relative cuto productivity across the two countries, which is a measure for relative welfare, is given by (ϕ *
autarky. When the two countries trade with each other, it follows from (10) that the relative
(1/k) > 1 and ∂Φ/∂φ > 0. That is, the dierence in domestic cutos (and, hence, in welfare) is larger with trade than under autarky, and is increasing in the level of trade openness.
The reason is that the technological dierence leads to a competitive advantage for the rms from the leading country: Since the market in country 1 has tougher selection, it is more dicult for rms from country 2 to export to the market in 1 than vice versa. This, in turn, reduces the incentives for entry in country 2 and leads to looser selection in that market, which even boosts the expected exporting prots for rms from country 1. The freer trade is, the more important are these considerations, and the stronger is the endogenous welfare dierence for a given exogenous disparity in ϕ M IN r across countries.
Basic Research Investments without Spillovers
We now turn to the analysis of endogenous basic research investments among two identically large countries (with L 1 = L 2 = 1). The tax revenue and public expenditure level in country r is denoted by T r . Analogous to the closed economy case, the amount of basic research is given by H (T r ) with H (0) = 0, H > 0 and H < 0. We assume in this section that there are no spillovers across countries. That is, the research conducted in country r does not aect the technological potential of the other country s, or vice versa. The technological potential in country r is consequently described by ϕ
M IN r
= exp {H (T r )}.
Nash-Equilibrium
We rst consider the scenario where both countries set their public research investments non-cooperatively. Taking into account (12) and the lump-sum taxes, welfare in country r can be written as follows:
where κ 3 = κ 1 +β ln Γ+
k is a measure of the relative technological potential of country r, withχ r > φ to ensure ϕ * r > 0 for r = 1, 2.
The condition for a welfare optimum is given by:
There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium where both countries set the same tax rate T r = T s = T . In that case, (14) simplies to:
Using (15) we can disentangle the dierent eects of higher research investments on welfare.
First, the required lump-sum taxes imply a marginal cost equal to unity. Second, the investments increase the own technological potential, which tends to raise the domestic cuto and average productivity as well as welfare. This is the marginal benet βH that we have already discussed in the closed economy case. Finally, there is a new trade eect, φβH / (1 − φ), which depicts the marginal eect of the research investments on the relative technological potential of the two countries. As discussed above, a higher relative technological potential is benecial for country r, as it leads to a competitive advantage for domestic rms relative to their competitors from the other country s. This mirrors the strategic incentive for governments to invest into basic research. The higher the trade openness φ is, the greater is the governments' incentive to give domestic rms 13 this competitive advantage. Trade liberalization thus increases the research investments in the Nash-equilibrium. To see this analytically, dene ζ = βH / (1 − φ) − 1 and use the implicit function theorem to obtain:
We can hence state the following result:
Proposition 3 i) The tax and public research expenditure in the open economy Nashequilibrium with two identical countries, T * , is higher than under autarky. ii) Trade liberalization leads to higher taxes and public research expenditure T * .
To illustrate proposition 3, consider again the example where H r = √ T r . We then have H = 1/ 2 √ T , and solving (15) which reads as H = (1 − φ) /β, leads to
2 ) in the Nash-equilibrium, which is larger than T * AU T derived above.
Cooperative Policy
Now consider the scenario where the countries cooperatively set their policies. Given the quasi-linear preferences with identical marginal utility of income, joint welfare can be precisely measured by a utilitarian social welfare function. Joint welfare Ω is given by:
where the interaction term in squared parentheses encapsulates the cross-country externalities of the research investments. The condition for a welfare optimum is given by
for r = 1, 2. Imposing T 1 = T 2 = T due to symmetry, the last two terms on the right hand side of this equation just cancel out, so that the simplied rst-order condition for the cooperative policy simply reads as
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We can hence state Proposition 4 Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic research investments. Without cross-country spillovers the cooperative policy is equivalent to the policy that each country would choose under autarky.
A comparison of propositions 3 and 4 directly implies that the Nash-equilibrium policy is characterized by over-investments into basic research from a social perspective, and that trade liberalization exacerbates this problem. The reason is that every government tries to
give domestic rms a competitive advantage in trade, but the eects of the own research investments are just oset by the impact of the foreign investments. When coordinating the research expenditures, those negative cross-country externalities are internalized.
With policy coordination the average productivity of rms is thus lower than in the Nashequilibrium, but this is optimal since the excessively high research investments in the non-cooperative scenario imply too little consumption of the homogenous good.
Basic Research Investments with Spillovers
We now turn to the analysis where the basic research conducted in one country does aect the technological potential of the other country. We assume that the technological potential in country r is described by ϕ
M IN r
= exp {H (T r ) + φ · F (T s )}, where the amount of basic research in the foreign country s is given by F (T s ). Analogously as before we assume that F (0) = 0, F > 0 and F < 0. Notice that the strength of the spillover depends on the level of trade openness, φ, which we consider to be a broad measure of the level of economic integration between the two countries. 9 5.1 Nash-Equilibrium
Considering rst the non-cooperative policy determination, the necessary condition for a welfare maximum can now be written as
There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium policy where both countries set the same tax rate T r = T s = T , in which case (19) simplies to
It follows from (20) that the marginal benet is composed of two terms, i) the term βH / (1 − φ) that is already known from the case without spillovers (see section 4.1), and the new spillover eect. Both terms increase in trade openness but have opposite signs. Comparing (20) with (15), it immediately follows that the Nash-equilibrium expenditure T * is lower with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. The reason is that the competitive advantage for domestic rms is smaller when foreign entrepreneurs also benet from the domestic public research expenditure.
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With higher trade openness this free rider problem becomes more severe, which dampens the government incentive to invest. On the other hand, freer trade raises the term βH / (1 − φ) which tends to increase the Nash-equilibrium expenditure. The question is thus if trade liberalization leads to an overall increase or decrease of T * when direct crosscountry spillovers play a role. To address this question, let ∆ ≡ H − F . One would typically expect that domestic research expenditure has a stronger impact on the domestic than on the foreign technological potential, i.e., ∆ > 0. We refer to this case as the weak spillover scenario. For this case it is straightforward to show that the Nash-equilibrium expenditure level is increasing in φ. Dene ζ = 
This term is unambiguously positive with ∆ > 0. Nevertheless, there may be instances where domestic research investments have a stronger impact on the foreign than to the home country.
11 For situations like this we have ∆ < 0 and refer to it as the strong spillover case. Solving ∂T /∂φ = 0 for φ leads toφ = 1 − −∆/F withφ < 1 if ∆ < 0. The Nash-equilibrium expenditure level T * is increasing (decreasing) in φ if the level of trade openness is below (above)φ. In other words, there is a hump-shaped pattern between φ and T * when ∆ < 0, and the downward-sloping range starts earlier the stronger the spillover is (the lower ∆ is). Summing up, we can state the following result:
Proposition 5 i.) For any given φ the Nash-equilibrium research expenditure, T * , is lower with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. ii.) Trade liberalization increases T * if spillovers are weak. iii.) In the case of strong spillovers, trade liberalization rst leads to an increase and then to a decrease of T * .
To illustrate this result, suppose that H = √ T and F = s √ T , where s denotes the strength of the spillover. With 0 < s < 1 we have a weak, and with s > 1 we have a strong spillover.
Solving (20) 
, which achieves a global maximum at φ = 1/s.
Hence, there only exists a maximum for T * in the admissible range 0 < φ < 1 if s > 1, while T * is monotonically increasing in φ for all s < 1.
Cooperative Policy
Finally, turning to the cooperative policy determination for the case with direct crosscountry spillovers, it follows from (17) that the condition for a welfare optimum now reads
for r = 1, 2, where the argument of the exponential function is suppressed to simplify notation and is given by exp {·} = exp {k (H (T s ) − H (T r ) + φF (T r ) − φF (T s ))}. Imposing T r = T s = T due to symmetry, this expression simplies to
Dene ζ = βH + βφF − 1 and use the implicit function theorem to derive ∂T opt /∂φ = −F / (φF + H ) > 0. We hence have Proposition 6
Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic research investments. With direct cross-country spillovers, trade liberalization leads to a higher optimal research expenditure T opt .
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The reason is that investments not only improve the domestic technological potential, but they now also generate a positive externality for the foreign entrepreneurs. The latter eect is stronger the higher the level of trade openness is. In comparison to the Nashequilibrium policy, the spillover thus does not dampen the incentive to invest. Exactly the opposite it true. Due to the positive externality, the optimal research expenditure level is actually higher with than without spillovers. To compare the cooperative with the Nash-equilibrium policy, we can rewrite the rst-order conditions (20) and (23) as follows:
Those expressions dier only in the last term of ∂V /∂T . The sign of this term depends on ∆, i.e., on whether the spillover is weak or strong. If the spillover is weak (strong), the public research expenditure in the Nash-equilibrium, T * , is higher (lower) than the optimal expenditure level, T
opt . Summing up, we have Proposition 7 i.) The Nash-equilibrium is characterized by over-investments into basic research if the direct cross-country spillover is weak, T * > T opt with ∆ > 0. ii.) When the spillover is strong, there are too little basic research investments from a social perspective in the Nash-equilibrium, T * < T opt with ∆ < 0.
This result represents the interplay between two cross-country externalities. Domestic basic research hurts the foreign entrepreneurs as it gives domestic rms a competitive advantage in trade. On the other hand there is a positive impact on the foreign technological potential. Depending on which impact dominates there is either a net over-investment or a net under-investment problem from a social perspective, and proposition 7 shows that the latter arises when the spillover is strong.
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-country model with heterogeneous rms where governments can invest into basic research. These public research investments improve the country's technological potential and thereby benet domestic entrepreneurs who start up a business. They do not equally benet all domestic rms from an ex post perspective, however, since rms are still exposed to idiosyncratic risks of business failure. There are two motives for this public research policy. First, the benevolent motive (present already in an autarky scenario) is to tighten rm selection which in turn raises the average productivity of rms in the market, decreases the average price, and ultimately benets consumers. Second, there is a strategic motive in an open economy setting, as rms obtain a competitive advantage in trade when the domestic country has a higher technological potential. Due to this strategic motive, countries invest too much from a social perspective, so that there are welfare gains from coordinating public research investments. This overinvestment problem only disappears, and turns to an under-investment problem, when there are suciently strong direct spillovers of research investments across countries.
We observe in the data that most OECD countries have increased public research spending over the last ten years. Our model provides a possible theoretical rationale for this empirical observation. The recent decade was certainly characterized by falling trade barriers and a deepening of globalization. The model predicts that this tendency of higher trade freeness raises the strategic incentives for governments to invest into basic research, and it is thus well consistent with the stylized facts. From a normative perspective, however, it is unclear if this tendency is welfare improving. Our model predicts that global competition induces single countries to over-invest into basic research, and trade liberalization tends to exacerbate this problem.
However, in practice further trade liberalization probably also leads to a stronger diusion of basic knowledge across countries. That is, cross-country knowledge spillovers may also become more important as globalization proceeds. These spillovers have two basic consequences: They lower the incentives for single countries to invest due to a standard free rider problem, but they also tend to reduce the over-investment problem. From a policy perspective, the optimal regime seems to be one where countries coordinate their research investments in order to internalize cross-country externalities, and where they also try to foster the cross-country diusion of the knowledge created in those coordinated public research eorts. 
